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Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was the latest step in Moscow’s 
steadfast rejection of the post-Cold War security order in Europe. Nevertheless, analysts 
and scholars remain puzzled as to what exactly constitutes Russia’s long-term game plan 
vis-à-vis Europe. This chapter suggests that, far from following a concrete, well-planned 
blueprint at the operational and tactical levels, Russia’s grand strategic objectives enable 
Moscow to adopt a fluid, adaptive posture aiming at achieving two interconnected goals: 
to maintain, or even improve, the continental military balance of power through the 
deployment of strategic weapons and at the same time acquire the capabilities to disrupt 
NATO’s air and naval superiority in critical flashpoints, an aspiration that had been elusive 
even at the peak of the Cold War rivalry. The implications of Russia’s grand strategic 
doctrine are thus crucial for Europe’s security outlook; Moscow’s approach implies that 
Russian deterrence at the highest levels will be robust, while low-level, disruptive tactics 
in areas where Russia maintains an operational advantage could challenge the European 
security status quo. Contemporary developments, therefore, may enable Russia to 
undermine NATO’s supremacy in the Euro-Atlantic geopolitical space, altering the post-





Understanding post-Cold War Russia constitutes, without a doubt, a major challenge for 
analysts and scholars alike. During the Kosovo crisis in the 1990s, Russian and NATO troops 
operated in the same area, raising concerns at one point that the two sides would actually 
confront each other (Gobarev 1999). Nevertheless, it was not until the end of the 2000s that a 
                                                          
* Corresponding author Email: bill.kappis@buckingham.ac.uk. 
Vassilis (Bill) Kappis 2 
series of failures to anticipate Russian behaviour forced NATO allies to commit substantial 
resources in an effort to better capture Russian strategic thinking (Osborne 2015). In recent 
years, the comprehensive reform of the alliance’s doctrine and organizational structure, more 
specifically, was primarily aimed at monitoring and anticipating threats to Central and Eastern 
European countries (NATO 2014; 2015; CSIS 2015). Following the escalation of the Ukrainian 
conflict in 2014, the American political establishment appeared willing to decelerate the 
country’s so-called “pivot to Asia,” assigning an unprecedented –for post-Cold War standards– 
number of “eyes and ears” to the close scrutiny of Moscow’s motivations and capabilities 
(Gardner 2014). 
Even now, however, several years after the initiation of Russia’s revisionist posture in 
Europe, the West appears uncertain about Moscow’s future conduct. To a certain extent, this is 
natural, as the re-emergence of Russia in European affairs remains a relatively new 
development. Until recently, numerous analysts in the West regarded Russian military 
capabilities with disdain (Gady 2015). Russia’s first military foray in a foreign country after 
1979 would soon function as a wake-up call to European and American military planners. The 
conflict over South Ossetia in 2008 escalated to open warfare between Moscow and Tbilisi, as 
the Kremlin reinstated Russia’s sphere of influence, halting NATO’s expansion, which had 
proceeded uninterrupted until that point.  
More recently, the Crimean crisis culminated in Russia’s first territorial expansion after 
WWII, at the expense of EU-backed and NATO-candidate Ukraine. Events in Ukraine 
rekindled threat perceptions at the highest echelons of power within the trans-Atlantic 
Community, eliciting the expectation that Russia would imminently target the Baltic States and 
possibly Poland (ECFR 2015; The Guardian 2015, 19 February). Moscow, however, chose to 
promote a “frozen conflict” scenario in 2015, under which Eastern Ukrainian provinces would 
avoid severing ties with Kiev. Odessa, a Black Sea port of great strategic value, did not, quite 
surprisingly for many, become a flashpoint for separatist forces. A further strategic surprise 
was on the way. A few months later, analysts were shocked to witness Russia’s direct 
involvement in the quagmire of the Syrian war, which entailed a substantial commitment of 
political, economic and military capital, all during a year of financial stress and diplomatic 
isolation for Moscow (Dekel and Magen 2015).  
The aforementioned examples indicate that the West is capable of both over-estimating and 
under-estimating Russian assertiveness. It is, therefore, not a matter of simply downplaying or 
upgrading evaluations of Moscow’s determination to challenge the geopolitical status quo. A 
refined narrative is necessary: one that captures Russia’s capacity to adapt effectively to 
changing circumstances and present its competitors with “faits accomplis” in a nuanced 
manner. In order to achieve this goal, an evolutionary approach to Russian security policy 
should turn the spotlight on the country’s grand strategic military objectives, as opposed to 
analysing Russia’s short and mid-term operational conduct. A “bird’s eye” view of Russian 
post-Cold War behaviour, therefore, reveals a fluid, adaptive Russian posture which aims to 
achieve two distinct, yet interconnected goals: to maintain, or even improve to its favour, the 
continental military balance of power through the deployment of strategic weapons and at the 
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RUSSIA’S RETRENCHMENT IN THE 1990S:  
ADAPTING TO A UNIPOLAR SYSTEM 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union unleashed NATO’s geopolitical dynamic across the 
previously inaccessible Eurasian heartland. The resulting power vacuum in Russia’s former 
periphery generated a window of opportunity, with the alliance swiftly responding to the call 
of Central and Eastern European capitals. Far from seeking revenge, Central and Eastern 
Europe sought to put its Communist past behind and become integrated into the West. In 
geopolitical terms, however, there was no denying that NATO’s enlargement would take place 
at the expense of Russian interests. At best, the alliance’s expansion into Eastern Europe would 
finally integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence. Alternatively, the inclusion 
of countries such as Poland and the Baltic states in the “West” would create a “cushion” against 
a Russian resurgence, should East–West tensions re-emerge at some point. It is also true that 
Moscow’s financial and political predicament in the 1990s undermined any serious prospect of 
a proper response to what would otherwise be treated as an encroachment of the country’s “near 
abroad.” Nevertheless, Moscow tried to counterbalance its unavoidable retrenchment by 
developing, or bolstering, its existing security ties with countries on the fringes or the periphery 
of NATO, including Armenia, Syria, Iran, Greece and Cyprus (Ergün Olgun 1999).  
To this end, the supply of advanced weaponry became a prominent policy tool. At the time, 
Russia had already deployed Scud-B missiles in Armenia (Howard 1997) and reportedly 
assisted Iran in developing 2,000 km range missiles, while the S-300 SAM missile system was 
exported to Syria in 1998 (Criss and Güner 1999, 368). Developed in the 1980s, the S-300 
SAMs have the capacity to engage six targets simultaneously – flying as low as ten meters 
above the ground or as high as maximum aircraft ceilings. Moreover, it boasts an operational 
range of 150 km for fighter jets and 40 km for ballistic missiles (AFP 1997, 15 January). These 
characteristics imply that the S-300 can be classified as a strategic, as opposed to a tactical, 
weapon. Thus, beyond the obvious need to seek new markets for the financially struggling 
Russian armaments industry, Russian weaponry entailed a grand strategic logic that was hard 
to ignore. NATO members took notice. In late 1997, the Turkish General Staff prepared a report 
which accorded the S-300 system a central role in what was viewed in Ankara as an “offensive 
ring” engulfing the country’s coastline, which hosted (national and NATO) military bases as 
well as sensitive infrastructure assets such as major ports and oil pipelines (IISS 1998). 
Nevertheless, Russia’s attempt to adjust its military posture to the sudden loss of its Soviet-
era strategic depth was largely unsuccessful. Syria, probably the most committed Russian ally 
at the time, engaged in discussions with Israel over the future status of the Golan Heights (under 
Israeli control since the Six-Day War of 1967), while its influence in Lebanon gradually eroded, 
leading to the eventual withdrawal of stationed Syrian troops (Rabinowich 2009). Greece and 
Cyprus, meanwhile, undertook a major foreign and security policy adjustment vis-à-vis Turkey 
in the late 1990s, following a series of tense crises in the Aegean Sea (1996) and Cyprus (1998), 
with the latter directly related to the procurement of S-300 SAMs by the Cypriot government 
(Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2012). The subsequent “Europeanization” of Greek-Turkish 
relations meant that Russian influence in Greece and Cyprus would erode. Despite the fact that 
Russian armaments were included in Greece’s defence procurement programs until the late 
1990s, Athens would become increasingly cautious in its dealings with Moscow, in an effort to 
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diffuse tensions in the Aegean Sea and accelerate the EU accession negotiations of the Republic 
of Cyprus.  
Concurrently, Russia had a series of urgent issues to attend to, closer to home. The 
economic crisis of 1998 dealt a blow to the Russian economy, which was at the time recovering 
from the shock of the Communist collapse. Moscow defaulted on its debt and the Ruble was 
devalued, while the upheaval generated by Chechen separatists threatened the territorial 
integrity of the federation (Gilman 2010). Should there be any doubt left about Russia’s 
incapacity to restore its pre-1990 geopolitical reach, the bombing of Serbia clarified the nature 
of the post-Cold War order by showcasing the conventional capability gap between the two 
former rivals. While Moscow had maintained a substantial nuclear deterrent (as emphasized 
repeatedly by the Russian leadership), the state of the country’s air and naval fleets indicated 
that the country’s capacity to project power in Europe was severely curtailed. In the following 
years, Moscow prioritized internal stability and then focused on deflecting NATO’s attempts 
to expand into the Russian “near abroad.” The Georgian and Ukrainian cases took precedence 
for Vladimir Putin, who began to perceive NATO expansion as detrimental, not just to Russian 
power projection, but to the security of the Russian Federation as well (Mydans 2004).  
 
 
THE 2000S: RUSSIA RE-EMERGES AND SECURES ITS BACKYARD 
 
In the 2000s, the Russian economy showed signs of recovery, bolstered by rising 
hydrocarbon prices, a major export commodity for Russia. Vladimir Putin had achieved to 
reassert effective control over the country, showcasing that internal stability was within reach, 
even at the cost of an iron, military and political, fist. The gradual economic recovery enabled 
the Russian armed forces to reinitiate investments in equipment and training, bolstering the 
Kremlin’s confidence. Yet, the first half of the decade is characterised by a robust political 
momentum favouring the further expansion of the EU and NATO. The 2003 Rose Revolution 
in Georgia, the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the 2005 Tulip Revolution in 
Kyrgyzstan agitated Russian policy-makers. These events, which caught Moscow by surprise, 
were deemed to be little more than Western-backed “coups d’état” with the goal of creating a 
political and security web around Russia. A few years later, Georgia would become a 
battleground through which Moscow would signal its staunch opposition to the further 
expansion of the EU and, crucially, NATO in the region.  
In 2003, the “Rose Revolution” brought Mikhail Saakashvili to power in Georgia. 
Saakashvili, a US-trained lawyer, was the lead figure of the peaceful demonstrations in Tbilisi 
against Shevardnadze’s “Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG)” party efforts to force a fraudulent 
election result (Cooley and Mitchell 2009, 28). Protestors managed to secure Shevardnadze’s 
resignation, and in January 2004, the newly elected Saakashvili promised to reassert Georgian 
control over the secessionist provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia within his first term 
(Hewitt 2009, 19). For Georgia, reintegrating its separatist provinces was not simply a matter 
of national pride. The porous borders of these regions facilitated illicit trade and exacerbated 
asymmetrical threats, compromising the nation’s security. The “frozen” conflicts of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, finally, undermined the Georgians’ desire and effort to secure candidate 
status with both NATO and the European Union.  
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On 7 August 2008, after a series of militarized incidents that had taken place during the 
preceding days, the Georgian army launched a military operation aimed at reasserting control 
over South Ossetia. The following day, the Georgian government announced the capture of 
Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital, which was devastated by artillery fire (The Telegraph, 
2008). In the meantime, however, Russia, South Ossetia’s long-standing ally, had launched a 
full-scale counter-offensive against Georgian forces located in both the secessionist territory 
and other parts of Georgia. In the ensuing days, Russian forces succeeded not only in driving 
the Georgian military out of the breakaway province, but also in opening a second front in 
Georgia’s other separatist province of Abkhazia. 
Before their eventual withdrawal in late August, the approximately 20,000 Russian troops 
who had taken part in the operation had advanced deep into Georgian territory, inflicting heavy 
damage and casualties in the cities of Gori, Poti and Senaki. Assets of the Georgian military 
and civilian infrastructure were destroyed, including the railway connection between the 
eastern and western parts of the country. While figures remain unconfirmed, some 238 
Georgians were killed, almost 1,500 were wounded and over 100,000 Georgians were displaced 
due to the conflict (Antonenko 2008, 24). In South Ossetia, Human Rights Watch puts the death 
toll in the lower hundreds, but the exact number of casualties has yet to be verified. European 
leaders were alarmed to see the American government stand idle as Russia undertook its first 
post-Cold War military offensive operation. It is indicative that the war ended with French 
mediation on 13 August 2008, with the mutually agreed “six point plan” establishing a ceasefire 
between Russia and Georgia. 
Moscow’s signalling of its growing discontent with NATO’s expansion in the region was 
becoming stronger. While in 2008 NATO avoided providing Tbilisi with a “Membership 
Action Plan,” the Council of the alliance affirmed that both Georgia and Ukraine would 
eventually become NATO members and that the parties would “now begin a period of intensive 
engagement with both at a high political level” (NATO 2008). Days before the escalation of 
2008, moreover, the Georgian army, along with 1,000 U.S. troops and forces from Azerbaijan, 
Ukraine and Armenia, conducted an exercise (“Immediate Response 2008”) in Georgia which 
aimed at increasing interoperability for NATO operations (U.S. Congress 2009, 3). Around the 
same time, some 8,000 Russian troops took part in the “Kavkaz 2008” exercise across the North 
Caucasus, including North Ossetia (IISS 2008). For at least the two years preceding 2008, the 
Russian North Caucasus military command and the Black Sea Fleet conducted exercises in the 
area under the scenario of repelling a Georgian attack on Russian peacekeepers based in 
Georgia (U.S. Congress 2009, 3). 
Relations between Russia and Ukraine had, meanwhile, deteriorated following the “Orange 
Revolution” of 2004, which brought to power the pro-Western government of Victor 
Yushchenko. Russia’s response to what it considered to be a Western encroachment was 
decisive. Moscow temporarily cut off gas supplies in 2006 and increased its pressure through 
the Russian-leaning constituencies of Eastern Ukraine, in an effort to delay, if not derail, 
Ukraine’s progress towards EU and NATO membership. Kiev responded by submitting a 
request for a NATO “Membership Action Plan” in January 2008 (IISS 2011). At the NATO 
2008 summit in Bucharest, a number of allies, led by the United Kingdom and Poland, 
supported the provision of MAPs for both Georgia and Ukraine, though strong opposition 
spearheaded by Berlin blocked the motion, as the deepening of relations with Moscow was high 
on Germany’s political agenda at the time (Asmus 2010, 119). The “loss,” moreover, of 
Ukraine was detrimental to Russia’s energy interests, as Ukraine had traditionally been part of 
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the route of Russian gas supplies to Europe. Moscow’s position was further compromised by 
the May 2005 inauguration of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which transports Caspian 
Sea oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, bypassing Russia.  
Finally, U.S.-Russian relations had also taken an irreversible turn for the worse. The 
Missile Defence plan sought to place missile assets near Russian borders, while the declaration 
of Kosovo’s independence in 2008 exacerbated Russian fears of American indifference to 
“legitimate” Russian concerns. Putin’s 2007 verbal attack in Munich against what was 
perceived to be a concerted Western effort to encroach on Russia was a first indication of a 
more assertive Russian stance henceforth (The Washington Post 2007, 12 February). Starting 
in early 2008, Russian statements regarding the status of the Crimean peninsula indicated that 
Moscow regarded the prospect of border change in the region under an increasingly positive 
prism (RFERL 2008, 24 August; Kommersant 2008, 4 July). The Ukrainian “front” would see 
a series of crises until the Crimean annexation and the outbreak of the civil war in the country 
a few years later, but Moscow’s message had been made clear: NATO’s expansion in the 
Russian “near abroad” was no longer acceptable. To this end, Moscow would initiate an 
extensive military upgrade and reorganization program, with the intention, according to James 
Stavrides, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, to apply pressure on the non-NATO 
states around Russia (South 2017).  
 
 
THE 2010S: SAILING FROM CRIMEA TO EUROPE 
 
The Arab Spring movement, a revolutionary wave of protests and civil wars that swept the 
Arab world, captured Moscow’s attention because a regime change could compromise well-
established Russian interests. The Libyan leader, Muammar Gadhafi, visited Moscow in 2008, 
resuming close Russo-Libyan cooperation after a long hiatus. The Russian government 
appeared willing to erase an outstanding Libyan debt of more than four billion USD accrued 
during Soviet times in exchange for an extensive agreement on trade, armaments and 
infrastructure projects (Fasanotti 2016). Russian diplomatic support of Libya’s secular, though 
oppressive, regime did not prevent the ouster of Gadhafi, following the NATO-backed military 
strikes of 2011 against his regime. The civil war in Syria transferred the “battlefield” to an area 
of prime concern to Moscow, threatening Russia’s closest ally in the region: the Assad regime. 
In the run-up to, and during, the Syrian civil war, Russian diplomats supported Assad in the 
United Nations and other fora, deflecting decisions and policies deemed harmful to Damascus 
(Tilghman and Pawlyk 2015).  
The West paid little attention to Russian concerns over the Arab Spring, partly because of 
a rather anaemic Russian military presence in the area. The chronic underinvestment in Russia’s 
decaying Black Sea fleet, based in Crimea, had taken its toll on the country’s power-projection 
capabilities (Korolkov 2015). In February 2013, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu 
emphasised that “the Mediterranean is at the core of all essential dangers to Russian national 
interests” (Inbar 2014). That year was a turning point for Russia’s strategic thinking, with the 
decision to create a permanent Mediterranean Squadron comprised of ships from the Black Sea 
fleet (Felgenhauer 2013). The country’s mid-term planning envisaged that by 2020, 132 billion 
US Dollars (almost a quarter of total projected outlays for the period) would be devoted to 
upgrading Russian maritime capabilities. By 2014, the 11,000 strong Black Sea fleet already 
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featured 6 Kilo class submarines and a surface contingent of 42 ships (Bodner 2014). A 
Mediterranean armada, integrated into the Black Sea fleet, quickly became visible through its 
activities in the Aegean Sea and adjacent areas. In addition to hosting Russia’s sole aircraft 
carrier at times, the task force grew to include more than a dozen warships at the height of the 
Syrian conflagration (Haaretz 2018, 28 August).  
In 2014, the assertion of Russian control over the Crimean peninsula consolidated a balance 
of capabilities in the Black Sea that seems particularly favourable for Moscow, taking into 
consideration that Sevastopol remains the “only naval base in the Black Sea capable of 
outfitting and dispatching new vessels and military hardware at a strategically significant level” 
(Gramer 2016). In force projection terms, however, the annexation of the Crimean peninsula 
would mean little if Russian access to the Mediterranean could be “filtered” by NATO through 
the Turkish-administered Bosporus Straits. The Straits “bottleneck” remains strategically 
relevant, as disagreements between Russia and Turkey over the Montreux Treaty, which 
regulates passage through the Straits, have resurfaced. Control of the Straits has been a Russian 
concern for quite some time and for good reason. During the Crimean War (1853-1856), Sir 
James Graham, First Lord of the Admiralty, considered the Straits to be crucial towards 
thwarting Russian influence, as they could restrain the Russian navy from accessing the 
Mediterranean waters (Badem 2010, 46-98).  
The aforementioned stark geopolitical reality could solely be addressed to the extent that 
Russia maintained a robust naval force at all times in Mediterranean waters. But logistical and 
operational support of a Russian fleet would necessitate berthing agreements with littoral states. 
This has proven to be a challenging task during the post-Cold War period. The Montenegrin 
government appears to have quietly deflected Moscow’s overtures in 2013 aimed at either 
establishing a naval base at the Adriatic port of Bar or increasing the scope of support provided 
to Russian fleet units at the country’s ports (IBNA 2013, 20 December). Rumours that Cyprus 
could host a Russian naval base surface regularly, only to be denied by the Cypriot government 
(Al-Monitor 2015, 3 March). After relevant bilateral agreements – and without special 
privileges – Russian ships make use of the strategically located port of Limassol on a frequent 
basis, while Russian aircraft can use Cypriot airports in emergencies and during missions of 
humanitarian nature (Cyprus Mail 2015, 21 January). For both Montenegro and Cyprus, 
alignment with Euro-Atlantic institutions has increasingly constituted a core policy pillar, with 
Montenegro acceding to NATO in 2016, despite deep domestic divisions on the issue (Balkan 
Insight 2016).  
The procurement of large, power-projecting ships could partly compensate for Russia’s 
inability to secure bases and long-term logistical support arrangements. The only Russian 
aircraft carrier, the Soviet-era Admiral Kuznetsov, has frequented Mediterranean waters, but its 
high operating costs and obsolete technology (The Moscow Times 2014, 29 September) render 
its presence more symbolic than substantial. The Russian navy tried to rectify this shortcoming 
by acquiring two new helicopter carriers from France. The attempted procurement of the 
Mistral-class carriers, amphibious assault ships that can accommodate a load of 16 attack 
helicopters and up to 900 combat soldiers (Jerusalem Post 2014, 19 April), became a polarizing 
issue among NATO members. The French sale was met with strong resistance from allies, 
culminating in the capitulation of Paris and a bitter diplomatic standoff between France and 
Russia. France finally cancelled the order and the ships were eventually acquired by Egypt 
(Defence Industry Daily 2016, 21 September). 
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Vladimir Putin’s sudden decision to engage the Russian armed forces in the Syrian civil 
war should therefore be understood under this prism. Russia’s geographic, economic and 
technological limitations, exacerbated by a well-established NATO presence in the 
Mediterranean, compelled Moscow to seek a permanent presence on NATO’s south-eastern 
flank. Between the initial stages of the Syrian conflagration and Russia’s involvement in the 
Syrian quagmire, Moscow had decided to bolster its naval presence in and around Europe, 
initially securing the Crimean peninsula. In the absence of a proper aircraft carrier fleet and 
extensive berthing rights, Moscow realised it urgently needed a permanent base in order to 
stabilise its presence in a crucial maritime area: the axis connecting the Black Sea and the Suez 
Canal. The Russian naval base in the Syrian port city of Tartus, hitherto of minor importance 
for Russian naval operations, was to become a strategic asset under the novel Russian doctrine. 
The ongoing Syrian turmoil provided the requisite pretext, with the Russian army swiftly 
deploying and Vladimir Putin asserting that “The collapse of Syria’s official authorities will 
only mobilize terrorists” (Stent 2016).  
If naval power projection was problematic for Russia, air power projection was almost non-
existent before the 2010s. The Latakia electronic listening (SIGINT) station was set up during 
the Cold War but was not designed to host a force of Russian aircraft. Russia’s air-power 
projection across the Mediterranean had thus remained a complicated issue, as Russian fighter 
jets would have to either cross Southern European (and thus NATO) countries, or fly through 
the Caspian Sea, Iran and Iraq, over states whose geopolitical orientation has been far from 
consistent. Moreover, some of the Russian fighter jets, such as the Su-25s, do not possess an 
air-refuelling capability (Mercouris 2015).  
Moscow’s Syrian foray, a move that surprised Western analysts (Stent 2016), was aimed 
at resolving the challenges of projecting naval and air power in the Mediterranean. The Russian 
intervention in Syria was accompanied, in 2015, by a commitment of military resources without 
precedent for post-Cold War Russia. Moscow’s military surge included ground attack aircraft 
and helicopters, naval vessels and marine infantry, with Moscow deploying long-range S-300 
missiles and advanced fighter jets to its Syrian bases. Russia’s conduct in Syria, overall, 
indicated that Moscow aimed at establishing a permanent presence that would engender an 
adverse effect on NATO’s freedom of manoeuvre in the area. Perhaps more importantly, the 
Russian strategy could seek to gradually assert air superiority over critical parts of the 
Mediterranean, thereby creating “pockets of disruption” within, or in proximity to, NATO 
allies.  
The West is gradually realizing the importance of these developments. In 2015, The 
Financial Times admitted that “Russia has not had any sizeable presence in the Mediterranean 
since the end of the cold war. And a lack of investment until recently in its decaying Black Sea 
fleet, had led strategic military planners to overlook the entire theatre as a possible source of 
concern when it came to Moscow” (21 October). Alexander Vershbow, NATO’s Deputy 
Secretary General, articulates the alliance’s adjusted perception of Russia in a clear manner 
when he characterizes Russia’s presence south of the Bosporus as “disruptive,” adding that 
NATO needs to “think about the broader consequences of this build up in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the capacity of these airbases (Financial Times 2015, 21 October).”  
The Mediterranean, however, is not the only relevant case study. The gradual militarization 
of Kaliningrad is similarly creating a “pocket of disruption” in a critical area for the defence of 
Central and Eastern Europe. The Kaliningrad oblast, situated between Lithuania and Poland 
was annexed by Russia at the end of WWII and functions, in essence, as a forward operating 
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base behind NATO’s front lines. In recent years, the Russian military has bolstered the 
capabilities of Russian forces in the enclave through, most notably, the deployment of the 
nuclear-capable Iskander ballistic missiles. The corresponding threat levels to the Baltic 
countries and Poland are elevated, as a Russian missile strike from Kaliningrad would leave a 
brief reaction window to NATO (Stavridis 2018). In both cases discussed, the combination of 
robust offensive (SAMs/fighter jets) and defensive (S-300/400) capabilities could create an 
anti-access, area-denial problem, with the prospect of establishing a no-fly zone over a critical 
location (particularly in the event of a crisis).  
Anti-access and area denial refer to war fighting strategies aimed at “preventing an 
opponent from operating military forces near, into or within a contested region” (Tangredi 
2013). Usually combined as Anti-Access/Area Denial or abbreviated as A2/AD, similar tactics 
have been employed in historical case studies such as the Falklands, after they were briefly 
captured by Argentina (Shunk 2018). While denying access to enemy forces may be a common 
goal among combatants, A2/AD strategies are particularly tailored to asymmetrical power 
relationships. In other words, a weaker party could adopt an A2/AD strategy in order to avoid 
a confrontation with a more powerful opponent, who may be the defender or the attacker. In 
this manner, the more powerful actor will theoretically be unable to bring its full force to bear 
in the operational theatre or maximise its control of the contested area. A2/AD strategies have 
come to the spotlight in recent years due to their potential applicability in East Asia, and 
specifically in a hypothetical crisis situation during which China decides to annex Taiwan by 
force. In such a scenario, China would conceivably be able to keep American forces outside 
the operational theatre through attrition tactics, instead of actually confronting American air 
and naval assets.  
 
 
BOLSTERING RUSSIAN DETERRENCE 
 
Technological advancements achieved in recent years by the Russian defence industry 
could not only offset some of the geographical and logistical challenges aforementioned, but 
also ensure that conventional deterrence is maintained in Europe, irrespective of NATO’s 
ballistic missile defence status. Russia’s naval doctrine can now ensure that targets are acquired 
from the safety of the Black Sea or even Russia’s extensive riverine system. The use of, for the 
first time, Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM) in the Syrian conflict, launched from the 
Caspian Sea, was aimed at sending a clear signal regarding the capacity of the Russian navy to 
target hostile ships and land targets at great distance, thus projecting power without running the 
risk of engagement with hostile forces (Fielding 2015). The value of conventional precision-
guided, long-range weapons has been demonstrated in numerous conflicts since 1990, as their 
use is not limited to the extreme escalation levels associated with nuclear warfare. Their 
development is also indicative of possible Russian countermeasures against the anti-ballistic 
missile system NATO is gradually establishing and deploying in Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean.  
Moreover, the upgraded Buyan corvettes, which have a displacement of less than 1,000 
tons at full load, could sail and launch their cruise missiles from Russian rivers such as the 
Volga or the Don. The supersonic sea-launched Kalibr missiles, therefore, with a range of 
approximately 1,500 km, pose a substantial challenge to NATO, threatening assets such as the 
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NATO base in Incirlik, Turkey. This development indicates that Moscow is in a position to 
challenge the alliance’s primacy in long-range, precision-guided strike capabilities. Admiral 
Aleksandr Vitko, the commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, has stated that cruise missile-
equipped ships will be permanently sailing in the Mediterranean (Blank 2016). Russian 
surveillance and electronic warfare assets, meanwhile, can now be regularly deployed close to 
listening stations in Turkey and the British RAF base in Cyprus (Akrotiri), further 
compromising NATO’s advantage in intelligence collection and electronic warfare. Moscow 
has, finally, announced that its Kirov class battle cruisers will be equipped with a naval variant 
of the S-400 by 2022 (Majumdar 2016), placing Russia in a position to protect its forces in 
Europe with its own air defence umbrella. These developments imply that Moscow’s deterrence 
is bolstered, as NATO allies in Europe find themselves within striking distance of Russian 
cruise and ballistic missiles. 
Russia continues, at the same time, to pursue anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons as a means to 
reduce NATO’s military effectiveness (Coates 2018), while concurrently upgrading its nuclear 
arsenal (including long-range delivery systems). In recent years, the Russian armaments 
industry has reclaimed its capacity to develop cutting-edge products such as the Su-57 fighter 
jet and the T-14 Armata battle tank. It was reported that during the testing of the new S-500 
system, the missile struck a target at a distance of 481 kilometres, rendering it the most 
advanced surface-to-air missile ever produced, with significant implications for European 
security when the system becomes operational in 2020 (Macias 2018). Overall, Russia aims at 
maintaining a credible deterrent at the conventional and nuclear levels while at the same time 





There is little doubt that a degree of uncertainty with regards to Russian intentions will 
always be present. Surprise, after all, is usually a privilege accorded to the challenger, not the 
defender of the status quo. This chapter suggested that, far from following a concrete plan with 
clearly delineated goals, Russia’s grand strategy allows for a substantial degree of flexibility. 
Maintaining credible conventional and nuclear deterrents while attaining the capacity to disrupt 
NATO operations in various flashpoints across (or in proximity to) Europe enables Moscow to 
gradually erode NATO’s red lines without risking an all-out war with the United States and its 
allies. The most important implication of Russia’s grand strategic doctrine is that low-level, 
hybrid tactics could trigger a security crisis in such a flashpoint, enabling Russia to capitalize 
on its local advantage and change the status quo.  
The excessive emphasis placed, in this regard, on non-military hybrid tactics may prove to 
be misleading. It has to be noted that the seizure of Crimea was catalytic in bringing the hybrid 
warfare concept to the spotlight, as the Russian endeavour constituted a highly successful, and 
for this reason alarming, showcase of the Russian ability to surprise and confuse. The artful 
use, in particular, of mainstream and social media for propaganda and disinformation purposes, 
as well as the level of integration of irregular forces (mercenaries and local militias) with 
regular elements of the Russian army, caught policy planners by surprise. Nevertheless, the 
Crimean operation would have probably failed, had Russia chosen to rely purely on low level 
tactics. Indeed, the Crimean annexation begun with a disinformation campaign but the situation 
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swiftly escalated, with masked gunmen storming government buildings and a full invasion of 
the peninsula taking place thereafter, making use of Russia’s airborne, naval infantry, and 
motor rifle brigades (RAND 2017).  
One could say, though, that Europe and NATO have been somewhat eclectic when 
deciding on what should be the “lessons learned” from the Crimean case study. In the months 
and years following the forced annexation of the peninsula, the domain of communication 
became a central pillar of NATO and EU strategic thinking. Initiatives such as the NATO 
Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga and the EU anti-propaganda unit were 
conceived as potential countermeasures to Russian narratives rendering Western nations 
vulnerable to political manipulation by the Kremlin. Such initiatives are, without a doubt, 
useful. A number of European analysts, however, proceeded to downplay the importance of 
conventional armaments and training in the novel environment of hybrid warfare. This line of 
thinking is anything but constructive and could in fact prove to be dangerous for European 
security. Warfare is a continuum, ranging from information and disinformation campaigns to 
nuclear warfare. Preparing to face a fragment of this continuum is, in essence, an invitation to 
escalate in the eyes of the opposing force. 
Furthermore, there is a danger of misreading Russian strategic thinking on the basis of a 
single case study characterized by a unique set of circumstances. The population of Crimea is 
predominantly Russian and therefore amenable to Russian media influence. Meanwhile, the 
geographic proximity of the peninsula to Russia and the presence of Russian military personnel 
in Crimea rendered the blending of regular and irregular tactics not only feasible, but also 
highly appropriate for the particular operational environment. There was simply no need for a 
direct confrontation with the Ukrainian army through the mobilization of conventional forces. 
It is unlikely, however, that this scenario can be repeated elsewhere. Russian operations in 
Syria, for instance, were of a more “traditional” nature, indicating that Russian strategic culture 
has not transformed but rather evolved, with conventional operations remaining at the centre 
of Russian strategic culture. Meanwhile, the conventional capability gap between Russia and 
Europe is widening, as most NATO members are reluctant to commit resources to defence. An 
excessive reliance placed by Europe on niche fields like strategic communications could, in 
this regard, undermine European capabilities further by diverting scant resources from crucial 
conventional areas.  
A few countries such as Estonia and Sweden (the latter despite not being a NATO member) 
appeared to understand the need to prepare and train their forces across the spectrum of 
conventional and irregular warfare, while the alliance bolstered its rapid reaction capabilities 
through the forward deployment of NATO assets in Europe. Signalling its intention to retain 
control of the Mediterranean, the alliance carried out in October 2015 an ambitious exercise, 
with approximately 36,000 troops, 140 aircraft and 60 ships pooled from over 30 countries, 
some of which, like Australia, are not NATO members (Villarejo 2015). The TRIDENT 
JUNCTURE 2015 exercise, hosted by Italy, Spain and Portugal, officially tested the alliance’s 
response mechanisms under a hypothetical scenario of instability in the Horn of Africa. The 
message, however, was intended to reach Moscow. 
In the absence of a strong and reliable EU security and defence apparatus, NATO has 
retained its role as the cornerstone of European security. On 20 October 2015, the American 
Navy announced that a NATO vessel stationed at the Spanish naval base of Rota had 
successfully intercepted a ballistic missile (for the first time in a European operational theatre) 
as part of a missile defence demonstration. The announcement came two weeks after the 
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surprise launch of 26 cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea by Russian warships against Syrian 
targets. In 2016, Jens Stoltenberg, the secretary general of NATO, announced that the alliance 
is planning to expand its presence in the Mediterranean by transforming the ACTIVE 
ENDEAVOUR operation “into a broader security operation (NATO 2016).” NATO’s biggest 
exercise since the end of the Cold War, TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2018, was hosted by Norway 
in October 2018, involving 50 thousand troops from all NATO allies, plus partners Finland and 
Sweden. The manoeuvres stretched from the North Atlantic to the Baltic Sea and lasted for two 
weeks, showcasing NATO’s capacity to mobilise substantial assets and plan for different 
contingencies in Europe (NATO 2018).  
The viability of a U.S. long-term commitment in Europe should be questioned, however. 
On multiple occasions after the end of the Cold War, American policymakers have emphasized 
Europe’s capacity and responsibility to guarantee its own security and safeguard the stability 
of its neighbourhood. The U.S. “pivot to Asia,” initiated by the Obama administration, sent a 
strong signal regarding the future of American grand strategy and Europe, presaging 
Washington’s gradual disengagement from the continent, accelerated by the Isolationist Trump 
administration. The waning of American dependence on Middle Eastern energy resources could 
strengthen the momentum of the U.S. decoupling, taking into account the increasing importance 
of the Asia Pacific as the focal point of American interests. The 6th Fleet features, for instance, 
a single command ship and four destroyers permanently assigned to the force, all based in 
Spain, with only rotational presence in the Mediterranean from ships passing through on the 
way to, or when coming back from, the Middle East (Altman 2016, 73). Nevertheless, there is 
always at least one Arleigh Burke-class destroyer in the area as part of NATO’s anti-ballistic 
defence umbrella. 
Finally, the EU’s recent financial crisis has rendered European leaderships reluctant to 
increase defence spending and assume additional security-related tasks. Britain’s role, 
moreover, in the provision of security for Europe after Brexit remains an enigma. Overall, the 
acute resourcing problem of European security undermines the long-term prospects for an 
effective response to status quo challenges posed by Russia. The drastic reduction of European 
defence spending after the end of the Cold War and the commitment of NATO assets away 
from Europe (NATO ships take part in the OCEAN SHIELD operation in the Indian Ocean, for 
example) are creating an increasingly perceptible capability vacuum. In the short term, the 
United States could transfer combat ships and perhaps aircraft from other operational theatres, 
though this strategic “band aid” would only partially alleviate the alliance’s credibility problem. 
In the long term, Europe will have to increase its defence outlays and bolster its capabilities in 
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